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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the significance of corporate governance mechanisms 
during the corporate governance reform using a sample of 117 non-financial Japanese 
firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1989 to 2001.  Japan’s 
prolonged recession brought about numerous reforms in post-bubble Japan.  Although it 
is plausible to infer that the corporate governance system in Japan may have been a 
factor that led to the sustained recession in Japan, it is vague as to how deep and 
thorough the changes to Japanese corporate governance have been.  The inference is 
that adverse impact of corporate governance may have been one of the factors that led 
to the sustained recession in Japan.  Numerous proposals have been offered and some 
implemented in an attempt to fix problems exposed during the recession period in the 
1990s.  Remedies include instituting reforms to corporate governance by establishing 
new standards, punishing malpractice, and changing corporate board structures.  Many 
Japanese firms look abroad for alternate governance mechanisms to integrate into their 
own system of control.  As such, most reforms propose changes, for the most part, 
reflecting the American-style of corporate governance: alignment in incentives between 
top management and shareholders, board size reductions, and greater board 
independence to promote better monitoring and firmer discipline  
The significance of proposed changes to traditional Japanese corporate 
governance is examined in this study.  Using a different econometric approach from that 
of previous studies, the relationship between board composition and firm performance 
is examined with a simultaneous framework of equations.  The purpose of this empirical 
framework is to tackle potential endogeneity problems between board composition, 
governance and performance variables.  Results show that: (1) there exists a 
significantly negative relationship between turnover of members of the board of 
directors and firm performance; (2) board size reduction is significant, but there is no 
evidence of consistent relationship between outside directorship and firm performance.  
(3) While keiretsu membership is generally relevant in linking board turnover and 
performance in Japan, board turnover is sensitive to performance in firms where 
ownership is concentrated than where ownership is dispersed.  (4) President turnover, 
whether routine or non-routine, is unrelated to performance.  Overall, results support 
that the entire board assumes responsibility for the firm’s performance and the 2SLS 
model is an effective estimator for estimating the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Japanese corporate governance, the system by which corporations are directed 
and controlled, has been a frequently encountered research topic for economists, policy 
makers and academics in the last decade.  Since the collapse of asset prices in Japan in 
the early 1990s, the prolonged recession and the floundering banking sector, the 
assessment of the Japanese corporate governance system has been critically 
reexamined.  Subsequent to the bursting of Japan’s stock and property market bubbles 
in 1991, Japan suffered through a lost decade - three recessions and depressed real GDP 
growth of roughly 1.2 percent.  Unemployment rose to its highest rate since World War 
II and consumer confidence collapsed.  Compounding the problem was a deeply 
troubled banking sector, with Japanese banks suffering from billions of dollars in bad 
loans (¥60trillion).  The Japanese banks shouldered loans that businesses are unable to 
repay, mainly from the financial bubble during the 1980s, despite the probability that 
they would never be repaid.   Consequently, Japan now has the largest gross public debt 
to GDP ratio of any country in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), reaching approximately 130 percent and is rapidly rising.  An 
explanation often suggested for this situation is the existence of a sub-optimal system of 
corporate governance.   
 2 
Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue that Japan’s economic problems are a result 
of more than faulty macro-economic policies and weaknesses in the Japanese system of 
corporate governance made the country more vulnerable to such difficulties.  During the 
entire recession period, Japan’s corporate governance system has been unable to prevent 
a litany of corporate scandals involving incidents from the destruction of capital to 
bribery to investor fraud.  Deep cross-shareholding relationships, absence of 
transparency and full financial disclosure, lack of independent directors and a heavy 
reliance on bank lending highlight maladies in the Japanese corporate system.  
Consequently, firms in Japan allocated capital according to established relationships 
rather than in pursuit of the highest return to shareholders.  For years, banks led 
corporate governance in Japan, providing a system of controls based on personnel and 
shareholding ties with companies that were once regarded as a foundation of stable 
management.  But this pillar of corporate governance in Japan has collapsed with the 
burst of the bubble economy in the early 1990s.   
Throughout the 1990s, corporate governance was much debated in Japan 
because of the failure of its control system during the stock market meltdown.  
Corporate governance reform attracted attention as one of the keys to revitalize 
Japanese firms.  A number of reforms were introduced to achieve a more effective 
governance system for Japanese firms.  Predominantly, the policies aim for changes to 
corporate boards.  Most reforms propose changes for the most part reflecting the 
American-style of corporate governance: alignment in incentives between top 
management and shareholders, board size reductions, and greater board independence to 
promote better monitoring and firmer discipline.  Further, amendments to the 
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Commercial Code allow large companies to opt for the American-style of corporate 
governance.  Nevertheless, there have been efforts to re-establish effective corporate 
governance in Japan as a result and firms began to reduce the size of their boards of 
directors and announce appointments of independent directors.   
 
1.2 MOTIVATION 
 
 Once the envy of many other economies in the world, the high economic 
growth period in Japan has stalled and lagged behind other leading industrial countries 
ever since the burst of the twin economic bubbles in the early 1990s.  Why has recovery 
taken so long?  The Japanese bank-centered system of corporate control, which worked 
well in the post-war catching up era, has been criticized as a weak system of corporate 
control.  In his survey of financial deregulations in Japan, Michael Gibson (1999) 
argues that the low return on wealth reflects characteristics of the Japanese corporate 
governance system and that financial reforms should focus on measures to improve 
corporate governance.     
In the 1980s, the US economy was stagnant, while the Japanese economy was 
booming.  Therefore, researchers and policy makers tried to take policies from the 
Japanese style of corporate governance in order to achieve strong economic growth.  
However, things changed over the next two decades.  Japanese firms are now looking 
abroad to adopt practices from the US system because the US was growing faster than 
any other matured economy.  This study is largely motivated by these changes in the 
Japanese corporate control systems.  Is there a stable form of corporate control for 
Japanese firms?  Researchers and policy makers are constantly attempting to address 
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this issue. 
In response to criticisms, a remarkable amount of corporate governance reforms 
have been proposed as a key to revive troubled firms in Japan.  Corporate board reforms 
have been the capstone in corporate governance discussions and the Corporate 
Governance forum of Japan (CGFJ) is just one example.  CGFJ, a private sector 
organization consisting of representatives from Japanese corporations, institutional 
investors and academia, set forth important corporate control guidelines and continue to 
define and promote best practice corporate governance principles.  Of the CGFJ’s 
proposals, CalPERS1 identifies three principles that are most significant and they focus 
on board governance.  First, corporate boards should include directors who are truly 
independent from the corporation and its affiliates.  Second, the size of Japanese 
corporate boards should be reduced to allow for effective and efficient decision-making 
related to executive performance and the firm’s strategic plan.  The third principle 
suggests that Japanese corporations should appoint auditors who are truly independent 
from the corporation and its affiliates.  Do the proposed changes to Japanese corporate 
boards necessarily facilitate superior performance?  This issue is the highlight of the 
study. 
This study provides an extension of prior research by Kaplan (1994), Kang and 
Shivdasani (1995), and Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) and is largely motivated by the 
results of these papers.  Similar to related studies, this research centers on a 
phenomenon in corporate finance that is very extensive and complex, i.e. Japanese 
                                                 
1 The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) has long 
been a leader in the corporate governance movement.  As the largest public retirement 
system in the U.S., CalPERS’ Board of Administration has concluded that “good” 
corporate governance leads to improved long-term performance.  
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corporate governance.  However, the interest to study this major phenomenon from a 
narrow perspective,  that is, focusing on the significance of board member changes and 
its relevance to firm performance, sets this study apart from related studies. Previous 
studies examine the effect of presidential turnover on firm performance only. 
Additionally, unlike in previous studies where a binary model is used to examine these 
issues, a simultaneous framework of equations is used in this study. The benefits of this 
framework are outlined in a later chapter.  As it is well documented, sound governance 
is critical for firms to perform well and ensure effective performance by corporate 
boards.  Therefore, resolving issues prevalent in board governance should help ensure 
that firms’ objectives are met, funds are well managed, and the interests of shareholders 
are reflected in strategic decisions.  In particular, turnover of board directors are 
examined since it marks a major event in a firm’s operation.   
Japan represents a unique setting to study issues of board governance because it 
confronts five corporate governance challenges.  First, the predominant form of 
business organization is the keiretsu - a group of companies linked by cross-
shareholdings, business contracts, mutual co-operation and often sharing a common 
name.  Second, compared to U.S. governance practices, there appears to be 
inefficiencies in the function of corporate boards in Japan.  The size of boards is large 
and outside directorship on corporate boards is rare.  Third, ownership is highly 
concentrated in Japan.  The main bank normally holds the largest block of the firm’s 
equity and there is a high degree of separation of ownership and control.  Fourth, firms 
rely heavily on external finance, and that is provided mainly through bank loans, in 
which the banks are not only major lenders, but also large shareholders of most 
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Japanese firms.  And last, Japanese leaders and bureaucrats, as stakeholders of the firm, 
can exert strong influence on managerial behavior.  Morck and Nakamura (2003) 
suggest that keiretsu groups were enthusiastic politic rent-seekers, raising the possibility 
that large corporate groups are better at influencing government than freestanding firms.  
Thus, rent- seeking might have impeded financial development and created the enduring 
economic problems in Japan.   
Furthermore, Japan is graying faster than any other industrialized country.  Its 
working age population is set to sink continuously over the next three decades.  
Consequently, decreases in long-term productivity and increases in health care costs and 
pension will certainly create a burden for the economy.  Therefore, it is important to 
improve corporate governance practices in Japan, which is suspected to be a remedy to 
Japan’s recession and will strengthen its economy, as the country must deal with these 
issues in the near future.  
1.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Findings in this study add to empirical literature on corporate boards in several 
ways.  This study provides strong empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
smaller boards are associated with higher firm value and regression test results show 
that poor performance initiates board turnover, while outside directors have minimal 
impact on Japanese corporations at the height of reforms in the 1990s. 
The first set of results shows a negative relation between firm performance and 
turnover of board members.  This is an indication that there exists a mechanism in 
Japanese corporate control that allows for the rotation of board members when firm 
performance worsens.  
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The second set of results presents evidence on the effect of firm performance 
and firm attributes on board composition.  It is generally accepted that outside directors 
play a monitoring role over the inside directors.  That is to say, when a firm 
underperforms, the proportion of outside directors serving on corporate boards should 
increase.   Previous studies by Weisbach (1988), Kaplan (1994), and Kaplan and Minton 
(1994) found evidence of this.  While board size reduction is significant, there is no 
evidence of a relationship between an increase in outside directorship and firm 
performance in this study.     
Thirdly, the last set of results show that keiretsu membership is generally 
relevant in linking board turnover and firm performance in Japan.  However, ownership 
concentration and the nature of the largest shareholders show the contrary, showing no 
effects on the appointment of board directors.  This implies that concentrated ownership 
can impede the disciplinary role of the shareholders when the firm is performing poorly.  
The study contributes to the empirical literature examining the relation between 
board composition, corporate governance feature and corporate performance in Japan 
during the decade-long economic slowdown and severe banking crisis.  Thusly, 
corporate law reform of corporate boards and its relation to firm performance is the 
main focus.  Unlike Kang and Shivdasani (1995) and Kaplan (2003), who only consider 
presidency turnovers, the effects of dismissals of a board member, regardless of his 
position on the board, are also considered in this study.  A second important difference 
between the study and that of related studies2 is that a simultaneous framework of 
equations is used in the analysis, while previous studies commonly use the OLS model.  
Turnover of board members should lead to improved performance during height of 
                                                 
2 See Li (1998) for example. 
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reforms.  Clearly, analyses show that considering turnover of presidents alone is not 
sufficient in explaining firm performance, so turnover of other members should also be 
considered.  In addition, the two-stage least squares specification provides a fine model 
to control for endogeneity between variables.  Cross-sectional OLS regressions of firm 
performance and variables entailing board characteristics governance may yield 
misleading and inconsistent results due to the potential simultaneity of variables. 
Therefore, these are two significant contributions to literature concerning Japanese 
corporate governance. 
This study is organized as follows.  The following chapter reviews the related 
literature.  Chapter 3 presents the hypotheses to be tested. In Chapter 4, data sources are 
explained, as well as the econometric models used in estimations.  The results are 
discussed in Chapter 5.  Chapter 6 concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND ON THE JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
2.1 JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
In its broadest sense, corporate governance encompasses the framework of rules, 
processes, and relationships by which a firm’s management is monitored by solving 
conflicts of interests among stakeholders or controlled to improve management 
performance.  The governance system can be external or internal.  In countries such as 
the United States and Great Britain control is external; whereby, markets exert influence 
mechanisms such as hostile takeovers.  The firm’s board of directors, on the other hand, 
exerts internal control, and the supervisory role is given to large shareholders.  In 
countries such as Germany and Japan, inside mechanisms dominate.  Correspondingly, 
this study explores the effectiveness of internal corporate control mechanisms among 
Japanese firms.   
The Japanese style of corporate governance system is recognized as a 
relationship-based system.  There is less emphasis on shareholders and more focus on 
relationships with employees and consumers.  Because banks hold large ownership 
shares of corporate equity in Japanese firms, they play an important corporate control 
role.  There has been an active debate in the literature as to whether the strong role of 
banks, in firms that they lend to, is good or bad.  The close and stable relationship 
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between the firm and the main bank is largely a result of the heavy reliance on debt 
financing, rather than equity financing.  Nonetheless, equity financing also has its 
unique feature.  New shares are often allocated to financial institutions or non-financial 
firms, or they are mutually held in the form of cross shareholdings, rather than being 
sold to individual investors.  The keiretsu is another distinct feature of the Japanese 
corporate control system.  It is a complex form of groups, consisting of a number of 
affiliated companies with cross-shareholdings, directorships and intra-group financing, 
which usually revolves around a lead bank.  All these features have made Japanese 
corporate governance unique when compared with the American style of governance.  
Although hostile takeovers are generally assumed to be the ultimate weapon to 
discipline managers, they are rare in Japan when compared with countries such as the 
United States.  This is due to the fact that there is the substitution mechanism in Japan - 
an extensive cross holding of equity among members of keiretsu firms.  The cross 
shareholding feature makes it exceedingly difficult for an external buyer to purchase a 
large portion of shares in a company. 
Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue that Japan’s main bank and financial keiretsu 
systems left corporate governance largely in the hands of creditors rather than 
shareholders, suggesting Japanese governance practices did not assign effective control 
rights to residual claimants.  They further infer that effective external governance 
predicts changes in ownership concentration and shifts in corporate ownership and 
control.  La Porta et al. (1999) emphasize the importance of law and legal enforcement 
on the governance of firms, development of markets and economic growth.  They argue 
that the protection of minority shareholders may also be an important function of the 
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corporate legal system.  Prior to the 1990s, it was rare for shareholders to execute their 
rights in court due to high legal costs.  Fortunately, under revisions of the commercial 
law in 1993, the fee to plead was reduced significantly enough for individuals to 
execute that right.  Another constraint that La Porta et al. (1999) identified in the 
Japanese system is that the general shareholder meetings are concentrated in a few days 
so it is inconvenient for shareholders to participate.  The identification of these 
challenges by minority shareholders allowed for a review of Japan’s commercial code. 
The following subsections of this chapter discuss the main features of Japanese 
corporate governance in detail. 
2.2 KEIRETSU  
 
Keiretsu and main banks are considered to have important roles in Japanese 
corporate control and governance (Prowse, 1992; Aoki et al., 1994).  The keiretsu are 
big conglomerates linked by widespread cross-shareholdings among member firms. 
Prior to World War II, Japan was dominated by successful family controlled-business 
groups, known as the zaibatsu.  The firm owners, typically founders or their family 
successors, controlled the company.  Most of the zaibatsu developed after the Meiji 
restoration in 1868, when the new Japanese government granted them subsidies and a 
favorable tax policy.  Banks did not play a significant monitoring role since most of the 
capital was raised internally or through issuance of new shares.   
By the early 1930s, the four dominating zaibatsu (namely, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo and Yasuda) had become a major feature of the Japanese economy.   
Zaibatsu used a hierarchical form of governance to monitor and manage its industrial 
companies and the groupings involved the use of a holding company and cadres of 
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professional managers to monitor the function of the firms.  These advantages, as well 
as close relationships with major political parties, placed these business groups in a 
privileged position in the economic development of Japan.  However, zaibatsu were 
dissolved after Japan’s surrender to the U.S. in World War II (1945).  The dissolution of 
the monopolistic organizations was announced as a major aim of the postwar Allied 
Occupation reforms to create a competitive environment.  Based on economic 
considerations, the Japanese government relaxed its policies in 1952, while maintaining 
its stance on monopolistic power.  And in the 1950s and 1960s, the zaibatsu reformed 
into enterprise groups, which is now known, as the keiretsu.  
 The most remarkable feature of the keiretsu is the reciprocal ownership of 
equity among member firms.  These trading firms are usually from a variety of 
industrial, resource and service sectors.  Although each member firm typically holds 
only a small percentage of shares of another member firm, the aggregate share of all 
members is normally large enough for the group to gain significant control over each 
member firm.   These groupings are integrated both vertically (connecting a 
manufacturer and its suppliers, distributors, and retailers) and horizontally (businesses 
extend into diverse fields) so that they are capable of controlling nearly every step in the 
economic chain.   
Therefore, this system of reciprocal ownership safeguards members of the keiretsu from 
hostile takeovers.   
Empirical results from previous studies have shown that keiretsu have lower 
average profitability than non-keiretsu firms and that there are differences in the 
governance structure between keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms.  In Japan, the majority of 
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large firms belong to keiretsu, which together make up a large proportion of the 
Japanese economy.  These groups of businesses have a close relationship with a main 
bank, which is often also a member of the keiretsu itself.  Among them, the largest and 
best-known keiretsu is the Big Six keiretsu (namely, the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumimoto, 
Fuyo, Sanwa, and Daiichi Kangyo group).    
Berglof and Perotti (1994) closely examine the governance structure of the 
Japanese financial keiretsu.  In the study, a refined model of the keiretsu is created 
based on the nexus between the main bank system, cross equity holdings, and the weak 
managerial market to highlight the effectiveness of this system.  They show that this 
system of corporate groupings can theoretically prevent managers from shirking.  In 
addition, the controlling mechanism rests in the group’s ability to monitor and remove 
incumbent managers.  Berglof and Perotti (1994) provide an example of internal control 
in force within the keiretsu by discussing how keiretsu bailout financially distressed 
firms.  The main bank is normally passive against their creditors, but when the firm 
faces financial difficulties, the bank intervenes and assumes control.   Notably, they 
identify the transfer of investment funds and the heavy use of trade credit among 
member firms as a feature of the industrial groups.  Empirical evidence shows that 
group financing patterns reflect the important features common to most keiretsu, 
characterized by dominance of main bank lending, extensive inter-locking of debt and 
equity, high level of leverage, and the intricate network of financial and trading 
relationships that links banks, member firms (e.g. manufacturers, suppliers, wholesalers 
and retailers), and government.  
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2.3 THE MAIN BANK  
 
In Japan, a bank having a strong and long-term relationship with its client firm is 
known as a main bank.  The main bank normally holds large shares in the firm and 
provides financial support over the long term; therefore, it plays an extremely 
influential role in corporate governance.  It is often cited that they have been a major 
influence in the economic success of the Japanese economy since World War II.  
The main bank performs three essential functions.  First, it is an efficient 
provider of readily committed finance to develop long-term investment projects.  In 
Japan, firms rely heavily on funds provided by banks due to close ties.  A survey 
conducted for 110,000 firms in 1992 shows 90% of Japanese firms have a relationship 
with a main bank (Dixon 1999).  The main bank creates loans and is usually its major 
creditor.   
Second, the main bank provides a type of contingent governance.  It monitors 
managerial performance and plays a disciplinary role in the corporate governance of its 
client firms when necessary.  As an agent for investors, the main bank examines the 
viability of investment projects of its client firms.  Day to day corporate affairs are 
normally left to the incumbent management when the firm is financially sound, but 
control turns over to the main bank when firm performance worsens.  When the main 
bank takes control, it intervenes in the management of companies to undertake 
necessary restructuring.  And a common practice of such intervention is the 
appointment of bank directors to the board of the company.   This implies very close ties 
between the bank and its client firm; therefore, the bank has the incentive to monitor the 
firm very closely.  The influence of bank-appointed directors on the corporate boards 
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reflects the important role of the main bank.  Moreover, studies have shown that the 
probability that a bank will send additional directors to a board is directly related to 
poor performance.3 Although other large shareholders, business partners, such as 
suppliers and clients, also monitor the performance of companies, their influence is 
subsidiary.  An important weakness in the main bank system is that firms face limited 
pressure from shareholders and other investors.  This is largely due to the fact that the 
main bank can acquire full authority for monitoring and collecting information relating 
to the firms’ investment decisions.  As a result, shareholders and investors may become 
discouraged to commit time and resources in gathering difficult to obtain information.  
These weaknesses created an opportunity for exploitation. Bribed banks and regulatory 
officials often overlooked the troubles of the firms, by concealing negative information, 
to avoid depressing the value of their own equity holdings.  Both Kaplan and Minton 
(1994) and Morck and Nakamura (1993) present evidence that appointment of bank 
directors increase with poor stock performance.  Further, Kaplan and Minton (1994) 
examine post-appointment financial performance for up to five years following the 
appointment of a bank director.   They predict that appointments ought to reverse, or at 
least stop, the deterioration in poor firm performance.  Results suggest that bank 
directors are appointed to firms that are in financial distress, and after the appointment 
of a bank director, performance does not deteriorate.  Therefore, banker appointments in 
Japan are disciplinary. 
 Third, the main bank has a provision of insurance against a client firm when it 
performs poorly.  The main bank of a firm often rescues the client firm facing financial 
distress by extending emergency loans.  This has been a common practice because of 
                                                 
3 See Kaplan and Minton (1994)  
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the long-term mutual commitments that exist between banks and client firms. And 
because ownership is concentrated, the main bank has the power to decide efficiently 
whether to bail out or liquidate its client firm when the firm is in financial distress.    
Previous works support the existence of main banks in the Japanese corporate 
governance system.  Kang and Shivdasani (1997) and Kaplan (1994) document the 
important role of main banks in the success of Japanese firms.  In addition, Hoshi et al. 
(1991) find that the levels of investment and sales decrease less for firms with strong 
ties with its main bank.  This finding confirms the main bank’s role as an efficient 
provider of investment funds to client firms by mitigating under-investment problems.  
Kaplan and Minton (1994) show bank relationships by identifying appointments of 
directors from main banks.  They document that appointments of bank directors 
increase significantly when performance deteriorates.  This is because the main banks 
assist firms when faced with financial troubles and can mitigate investment 
inefficiencies. 
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) extend and support the work of Kaplan and Minton 
(1994).  They find evidence that nonroutine turnover of poor performance managers 
improves firm performance for Japanese firms.  Further, they find that firms with ties to 
a main bank are more likely to remove top executives for poor earnings performance 
than firms without ties to a main bank.  They identify the previous experience for 14 of 
the 18 cases of outside appointments and find that banks play an important role in 
outside succession by appointing one of their own executives as president.   
While the main bank system has its strengths in Japanese corporate governance, 
it does not exist without its weaknesses.  The costs of main bank affiliation have been a 
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focus of recent studies, especially after the economic downturn in the 1990s.  Much of 
this research emphasizes the economic costs of a close banking relationship between the 
main bank and the firms to which they have provided both equity and debt capital.  
Deregulation during the 1980s allowed firms to seek alternative sources of finance for 
the first time in post-war era.  As a result of the expanded non-bank financing options, 
there was an increased diversity in the capital structure of the Japanese firm.  And by 
comparing alternative financing options, researchers are able to identify the negative 
effects of main banks on Japanese corporate governance.  For example, Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1998) find a weak association between firms with a main bank and profitability 
and growth and the cost of capital for a firm involving a main bank is higher than that of 
a comparable firm without a main bank. They explain that bank pressure induce 
artificially high loan flows as well as inefficient investment strategies.  Consequently, 
client firms can end up using more than the profit-maximizing level of capital.   
Morck and Nakamura (1999) also identify weaknesses in the main bank system.  
Their results show that main bank oversight is less effective than shareholder oversight 
in firms in Japan, which implies a need for an alternate corporate control mechanism.  
Banks have not closely monitored the client firms and become active only when they 
experience financial difficulties.  Further, they point out that Japanese banks act 
primarily in the short-term interests of creditors when dealing with firms outside bank 
groups. 
Hiraki et al. (2003) critically assess the significance of the role of the main bank.  
They report that main bank borrowing is negatively associated with firm value and that 
holdup costs are significant for bank affiliated firms in Japan.  In this context, the 
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prevailing holdup problem is described by the situation where the monitoring bank, 
using its monopoly power in information, extracts rents from its client firms, which in 
turn leads them to distorted (commonly over-investment) decisions.  In order to 
generate interest income, the bank urges firms to take on more investments and in some 
cases, negative NPV projects.  In light of the mixed evidence on the importance and 
nature of main banks in Japan, their findings are worth revisiting.  
 
2.4 THE JAPANESE CORPORATE BOARD  
 
Since the 1990s, Japanese corporations have strived to gain efficient internal 
management control and the corporate board has been the main focus of corporate 
governance debate since it links managers and investors.  Theoretically, the main 
function of the board is to help solve the agency problems prevalent in managing an 
organization.   By performing its control role, the board is expected to align the interests 
of board directors as well as senior executives’ with those of the shareholders to 
minimize agency cost and protect shareholders’ long-term interests.  The corporate 
board, with its mix of expertise, independence and legal power, is potentially a powerful 
governance mechanism.  However, despite the boards’ top position in firms, in practice, 
it has been criticized that many boards are in fact not very effective.   
Boards of directors are generally made up of a mixture of insiders and outsiders, 
but there is still uncertainty as to how this mixture is determined to achieve optimal 
board composition.  In the case of Japan, it is argued that the number of outside 
directors serving on a corporate board is simply too small. 
The relation between board composition and firm performance has been a focus 
of corporate governance research.  In particular, appointments of new outside directors 
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to corporate boards appear to matter.   A common approach to address this issue is to 
study stock price reactions to announcements of a change in board composition.  
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that stock prices increase by about 0.2 percent, on 
average, when companies appoint additional outside directors.  This increase is 
statistically significant, but economically small, and could reflect signaling effects, 
rather than an actual correlation between board composition and firm performance.   
In Japan, boards of directors are large compared to those in the U.S.4 Japanese 
boards generally consist of 20 to 35 members, who are typically insiders.  While 
formally elected at the shareholders’ meeting, the members are in effect, appointed by 
the CEO, who is the President of the board.  Outside directors are rare in Japan (Kaplan 
1994) and they may not be truly independent.  They can be from other companies in the 
group or infrequently from the bank.  The corporate board consists of directors at 
different levels, beginning with the Chairman, the President, Senior Managing 
Directors, Managing Directors and the Directors.  Not every position is necessarily 
found in every firm.  Representative Directors are selected from the top-level directors 
and they have special rights to represent the company.   
In the Japanese corporate governance system, boards of directors show to have 
an internal monitoring role.  They are responsible for monitoring the company 
president, as in the U.S., as well as managing the company and supervising 
management.  For example, the acquisition or sale of substantial asset, large borrowings 
and dismissal of managers are not carried forth without the board’s approval. This dual 
nature of their role is set by corporate laws in Japan (mainly codified in the Commercial 
Code), which stipulates that the board of directors shall determine the administration of 
                                                 
4 The number of board directors serving on corporate boards averages 11 in U.S. (2003). 
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company affairs and supervise the execution of the directors’ duties.  Also, different 
from the system in U.S., where the outside directors fulfill the task of governing, 
insiders play a dominant role on the board. 
  There is an equivalent of a second tier in the board structure called the 
President’s Council, which is made up of financial intermediaries and inter-corporate 
owners.  Shareholders exert influence on the board by interacting with managers of the 
firm in the monthly President’s Council meeting.  Although no votes are taken at the 
meeting, the president is swayed by consensus opinions of the council.  
  In Japan, the entire board assumes responsibility for firm performance.  This is 
contrary to the usual practice in the U.S., where the CEO exercises extensive authority 
and is responsible for the performance of the firm.  In which case, it follows that the 
corporate governance mechanism is probably most appropriately analyzed by studying 
the turnover of CEOs.  However, in the Japanese context, analysis overlooking the role 
of board members other than the president may miss some important features of 
disciplinary mechanisms.  As such, both board and presidency turnover are analyzed in 
this study.  Further, changes in board composition and the significance of outside 
directors are examined in this study because outside directors presumably play a larger 
role in monitoring management than inside directors.   
 
2.5 PRESIDENT TURNOVER AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 Over the past two decades empirical researchers have produced a large body of 
evidence on the relationship between top executives turnover and firm performance in 
the U.S.  These studies, for the most part, are based on agency theory of the firm where 
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managers are agents acting in the best interest of shareholders to maximize firm value.   
Among numerous findings, the one most relevant for this study is evidence that 
suggests an increased likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance.5  This 
relationship is significantly stronger when outside directors dominate the board or in 
firms with a block shareholder because lack of board independent leadership in firms 
makes it difficult to remove poorly performing managers.   
 In a more recent study, Brickley (2003) summarizes a set of conclusions which 
emerge from the existing literature.  He finds that CEO turnover is inversely related to 
both stock performance and accounting-based firm performance measures.  Further, 
CEOs are more likely to separate from the firm when stock price and accounting 
performance deteriorates.  Most researchers study this association for publicly traded 
firms, yet similar relations have been found within nonprofit hospitals and at the 
divisional level of the firm.   
 Consistent with economic intuition, boards dominated by outside directors are 
more likely to dismiss a CEO for poor performance and are more likely to replace a 
poorly performing CEO with an outside candidate (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988).  
However, the sensitivity of turnover to firm performance decreases with management 
stock holdings and when the manager is a member of the founding family of the 
company.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) provide evidence that boards with significant 
managerial ownership are more likely to act in the interest of the shareholders.  On the 
other hand, executive ownership may lead to managerial entrenchment in which it 
becomes difficult to remove an under-performing manager.  Rosenstein and Wyatt 
                                                 
5 For example, Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Warner et al. (1988), Weisbach (1988) and Parrino (1997).  
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(1990) find that the probability of top management turnover is inversely related to their 
equity ownership when poor firm performance is controlled for.  
   In larger firms, lower-level managers from within the same firm usually 
replace CEOs.  However, outside replacements have become more common in recent 
years.  For example, 8.3 percent of the new CEOs hired by S&P 500 firms during the 
1970s were from outside the firm.  From 1990 through 1997, the percentage was 18.9 
(Murphy 1999).  Results differ when the nature of top executive departures is used.  The 
probability of an outside replacement of a CEO is negatively related to prior firm 
performance, especially when the departure of the previous CEO was forced.  Covered 
in a Forbes survey, between 1969 and 1989, 49.6 percent of the 127 forced CEO 
departures in large firms were followed by outside replacements, compared to only 9.9 
percent for voluntary departures (Parrino 1997). 
 Turnover of top executives in Japanese firms has been an increasingly 
researched subject.  It has been observed that a similar negative relationship between 
top executive turnover and firm performance, both stock performance and accounting 
performance measures, is evident in countries with different corporate governance 
mechanisms.  The evidence suggests that internal corporate control mechanisms do 
serve to discipline incompetent managers.  The sensitivity of executive turnover to the 
different measures of firm performance is not very different from the one found for the 
U.S.  In a very influential paper, Kaplan (1994) investigates the turnover of top 
executives in Japanese companies and finds a negative relation between turnover and 
performance.  Later studies such as Kang and Shivdasani (1997) confirm this result.  
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Subsequently, the contributions of these two papers will be discussed in the context of 
Japanese board governance. 
 
2.6 THE ROLE OF SHARE OWNERSHIP 
 
 In Berle and Means’ classic study, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (1932), they discuss the phenomenon of the domination of large public 
corporations by professional managers as the separation of ownership and control.  
From their perspective, shareholders lost complete control of the management of the 
corporation.  Managers not only overlooked the management of the company, but they 
were also in control of the company.  Berle and Means (1932) identify that a 
consequence of the phenomenon was the domination of board directors who were 
appointed because of some prior relationship with management.  As a result, boards 
comprised either of managers themselves or the managers’ associates (i.e. inside 
directors) rather than non-affiliated directors (i.e. outside directors).  
 Ownership structure is closely related to different types of corporate control.  
Because there is a tradeoff between the motive for owners to monitor management and 
dispersion of firm ownership, differences in corporate ownership structures predict 
variation in systems of corporate control.  Claessens and Fan (2002) review literature on 
corporate governance issues in Asia.  Generally, the typical Asian corporation is 
dominated by one or several members of a family who tightly hold shares of a 
corporation. Different from other Asian firms, the dominant ultimate owners of 
Japanese firms are characterized by cross holdings of shares by industrial and financial 
groups.  They document that high ownership concentration of Asian corporations 
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increases the risk of expropriation of minority rights, which is reflected in firm 
valuations.  Further, such agency problems are exacerbated by low corporate 
transparency associated with rent-seeking and extensive group structures. 
 It is well known that concentration of ownership is still one of the remarkable 
characteristics of the Japanese corporate system as it presents the most extreme case of 
separation of ownership and control of listed companies in the world (Patrick 2004).  
Control is generally in the hands of management and shareholding is dispersed.   
 The shareholders of Japanese firms can be categorized into four main groups.  
The first group is the set of financial institutions consisting of the main bank, other core 
banks, life and casualty insurance companies, and securities companies.  Together they 
hold up to 20 to 30 percent of the shares and play a significant, although decreasing, 
role as monitors for corporate governance purposes.  The second group includes other 
industrial companies, each of which holds only a small percentage; together, amounts to 
another 20 to 30 percent.  The third group holds no more than 25 percent of a 
company’s shareholding.   It consists of individual and outside institutional investors.  
The last group is the foreign institutional shareholders. The ownership of outstanding 
shares of Japanese firms held by this group has risen sharply to about 20 percent in 
recent years.   
 Conceptually, concentrated ownership may improve performance by imposing a 
higher degree of managerial monitoring, which alleviates problems resulting from 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers.  Nonetheless, frequently 
debated is the possibility that large shareholders exercise their control rights to 
expropriate smaller investors.   
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 There has been considerable research on the relation between ownership 
structure and firm performance.  Morck et al. (1988) estimate a piece-wise linear 
regression between the level of management ownership and Tobin’s Q using data for 
U.S. firms and observable a non-linear correlation6.  Likewise, McConnell and Servaes 
(1990), also using US data, regress Tobin’s Q on both the percentage of shares held by 
corporate insiders (i.e. officers and directors), its square and other financial 
characteristics and find similar results to those of Morck et al. (1988).  They observe 
that the level of managerial ownership is positively associated with firm performance at 
low management ownership levels (range of 0% to 40-50%), although negatively 
related at high ownership levels.  Such studies argue that alignment and entrenchment 
effects influence the relation between ownership levels and firm performance yielding a 
non-linear relationship.  This is an implication that the benefits of large shareholders 
reach its peak, beyond which costs of concentrated ownership will outweigh the 
benefits.  Comparably, the role of share ownership is also studied for Japanese firms.  
Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) find a positive significant relationship between levels 
of ownership and profitability.  Morck et al. (2000) observe that the level of director 
ownership is positively related to Tobin’s Q in Japan.  They provide an important 
interpretation of this result that a negative relation at high ownership levels is not 
observed in Japan due to the rarity of hostile takeovers.    In which case, superior 
shareholder monitoring of management are observed in firms with high levels of 
ownership and an entrenchment effect not ought to be observed in Japan. La Porta et al. 
(1999) examine the distinctly different governance regimes found around the world.  
                                                 
6 They report a significant positive relationship between the fraction of shares owned by corporate 
management and Tobin’s Q in the 0 % to 5% ownership range and beyond the 25% ownership level.  A 
negative relation is observed in the 5% to 25% range. 
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They find that concentration of ownership is highly related to the framework to protect 
corporate shareholders.     
Reform of capital markets, in collaboration with reorganization of financial 
institutions and financial deregulation since the 1980s brought about slow but steady 
changes in corporate ownership in Japan.  One such change to Japan’s shareholder 
structure is the unwinding of cross shareholdings and it is still true that corporate 
ownership is highly concentrated on banks.  Kuroki (2001) reports that the proportion of 
cross shareholding decreased gradually in the 1990s, from approximately 17 percent at 
the end of 1990 to approximately 10 percent by the end of 2000.  It has been observed 
that the proportion of shares held by financial institutions has declined, while the 
proportion of foreign shareholders has grown.  There is also an obvious trend towards 
indirect ownership by the personal sector through institutional investors, although it is 
not yet as high as it was during the bubble economy.   
2.7 RELATED STUDIES 
 
Kaplan (1994) studies management turnover in Japanese firms.  He examines 
whether top management turnover and compensation changes are related to firm 
performance for 119 Japanese firms in the Fortune International 500 from 1980 to 1988.  
The study provides a comparative study of executive turnover to firm performance at 
U.S. and Japanese firms.  He finds a significant negative relationship between non-
standard top executive turnover likelihood and stock price performance for Japanese 
firms.  His results also show that the coefficients of stock returns are significantly 
different between U.S. and Japanese firms.  Kaplan (1994) also reports that CEO 
turnover in U.S. firms is more sensitive to firm performance than presidential turnover 
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in Japanese firms because there is an alternative corporate governance mechanism (for 
example, main banks) in Japan.   Further, his results do not show a significant 
relationship between firm performance and routine turnover.  He argues that this finding 
suggests it is standard for Japanese presidents to resign their presidencies at regular 
intervals, regardless of firm performance.  And this is consistent with the fact that the 
president often becomes chairman after resignation.   Kaplan (1994) also documents a 
positive relationship between changes in director compensation and firm performance.  
While U.S. managers receive more compensation than their Japanese counterparts, he 
observes that the relation between turnover and performance and between compensation 
and performance does not differ much from those in large U.S. firms.  Much of the 
article is devoted to the differences.  He finds that Japanese boards tend to weigh poor 
performance more heavily in both the compensation and turnover arenas. Viewed 
together, this, and lower executive ownership imply that the role of bank monitoring is 
more important in Japan than in the U.S. 
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) also study management turnover for Japanese 
firms.  Using data on 270 Japanese firms in Moody’s International Reports from 1985 to 
1990, Kang and Shivdasani (1995) examine the effect of main banks, block holders, 
keiretsu groups, and outside directors on the relation between top executive turnover 
and firm performance.  Their analyses focus on non-routine turnover and outside 
succession since they are likely to constitute disciplinary events.  Consistent with 
evidence provided by Kaplan (1994), Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find a negative 
relation between non-routine top executive turnover likelihood and firm performance 
for Japanese firms.  Also, it is observed that the effect of firm performance on standard 
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presidential turnover is small.  Main banks and large shareholders also play an 
important role in the likelihood that a new top executive will be appointed from outside 
the firm.  They find some evidence of a marginally stronger relation between stock-
price performance and non-routine turnover for firms with high levels of block 
ownership. Conditional on turnover, they find that a successor is more likely to be 
appointed from outside the firm when ownership by the top ten shareholders is high or 
there exists a main bank relation.  Taken together, their results suggest that mechanisms 
such as the main bank system and concentrated equity ownership perform an important 
governance role in Japan. In contrast to evidence from Kaplan’s (1994) study, the 
presence of outside directors on the board has no effect on turnover likelihood.  Kang 
and Shivdasani (1995) suggest two possibilities for this result.  First, it is possible that 
the outside directors are not able to remove poorly performing presidents since they 
never constitute a majority of the board in their sample.   Alternatively, they are unable 
to distinguish between directors who may have close business or family ties to 
management and those who are truly independent.  Finally, they find that new outside 
directors perform a more important governance role than existing outside directors 
during the process of top executive turnover.   
Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) assemble board composition and financial data on 
the 1,000 largest Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 1986 to 1994 
to study which firms tend to appoint outside directors to their boards.  Reformists 
persistently argue that Japanese firms maintain inefficiently few directors resulting in 
sub-optimal board structures.  However, Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) argue that, by 
standard economic theory, market competition should drive firms toward their firm-
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specific optimal board composition.  And that optimum need not involve many 
outsiders since outsider trade expertise for their independence.  
Three main hypotheses are tested to explore the determinants and effect of 
outside director appointments.  First, they postulate that if the reformist intellectuals are 
right, then Japanese boards do matter, but most are structured inefficiently.  They made 
the point that given that at least some substantial minority has a meaningful number of 
outside directors, the firms with more outsiders should evidently outperform those with 
fewer.  They find that Japanese companies with more outside directors simply do not 
observably show superior performance than those with fewer.  Instead, as the logic of 
market competition predicts, board composition seems endogenous.     
Second, the firms for which board composition matters will have boards 
approaching their firm-specific optimum, driven by market constraints.  Board structure 
should bear no observable relation to firm performance.  Rather, firm characteristics 
should determine board structure.  They control for such effects by including industry 
dummy variables for affiliation in various industries.  Results show that board 
composition is in fact endogenous.  Given that the composition does not change from 
the go-go 1980s to the depressed 1990s, optimal board structure seems unrelated to 
macroeconomic environment.    
And last, if board composition just does not matter, then firm performance will 
show no relation to board structure.  Thereby outside directors will be randomly 
distributed across firms.  Regression results confirm that outsider appointments are 
decidedly non-random in Japanese firms, suggesting that board composition is relevant.  
They observe that firms appoint directors from the banking industry when they borrow 
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heavily, when the firm has fewer mortgageable assets, or when the firm itself is in the 
services and finance industry.  Firms appoint retired governance officials when they are 
in construction and sell a large fraction of their output to government agencies.  Also, 
firms appoint retired business executives when they have a dominant parent corporation 
or when they are in the construction industry selling heavily to the private sector.   
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CHAPTER 3 
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
With respect to previous research, the following hypotheses will be tested to 
gain insight into the effects of board composition and corporate governance features on 
firm performance in Japanese corporations.   
3.1 HYPOTHESIS ONE 
 
Board turnover is considered since it marks a significant event in a corporation’s 
operations.  The governance structures of corporations can be understood as a body of 
institutional agreements concerned with ways of aligning interests of investors and 
managers and ensuring that firms are run for the benefit of investors.  In theory, the 
board of directors serves as a vitally important safeguard for shareholder interests in 
public companies through its monitoring and control activities (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  The board has legal authority to ratify and monitor managerial initiation, and 
evaluate and reward, or penalize the performance of top managers.  While one of the 
principal responsibilities of the board of directors is to monitor the company’s 
performance, poor firm performance would indicate that the directors’ jobs are not 
performed to their highest capability; thereby, that should initiate changes in board 
membership (Kaplan, 1994 and Kang and Shivdasani, 1995).  And since poor 
performance signals a change in management, positive performance with a new board 
structure should eventually follow. 
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HYPOTHESIS 1:  Negative performance leads to a change in board members; 
subsequently, a positive effect on stock return performance should be observed.  
3.2 HYPOTHESIS TWO 
 
The second research question attempts to determine whether or not reforms are 
driving changes in Japanese corporate governance by promoting supermajority 
independent boards.  The majority of the existing studies classify the members of the 
board into two broad groups:  insiders and outsiders.  Insiders refer to directors who 
form part of the firm’s management team and, thus, work full-time in the firm.  This 
group also includes firm employees, retired employees, and even family members of the 
firm employees.  The remaining directors are outsiders, whose members frequently 
work in other firms with other responsibilities.  While the inside directors provide 
valuable information about the firm’s activities, the outside directors may contribute 
both expertise and objectivity in evaluating managers’ decisions.   The general view of 
outside directors is that they are not aligned with management; rather, they will act 
independently from management in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties to maintain 
their reputation as insightful executives and effective monitors.  Their only tie to the 
firm is their directorship.  External directors are expected to be the best delegates of the 
shareholders and they should act as professional referees who resolve potential conflicts 
of interest among senior directors (Fama 1980).  Therefore, it is expected that the 
presence of outside directors on a corporate board is an assurance that the board will 
effectively exercise a high degree of monitoring.   
 In fact, empirical studies have substantiated the monitoring role played by 
outside directors and there has been a global trend towards the increased representation 
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of outsiders on corporate boards.  For example, Weisbach (1988) finds that the higher 
the proportion of outsiders on a board, the more likely it is that the board will replace 
the firm’s CEO following a period of poor performance.  Similarly, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) proclaim that the likelihood of insiders leaving a board and outside 
directors will join is higher when the firm performs poorly or leaves an industry.  This 
finding infers that there is a need for additional outside guidance when a shift in 
strategy is required.  Furthermore, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) document that the 
appointment of outside directors leads to significant, positive, share price reactions.  
Viewed together, these results confirm that outside directors effectively carry out their 
function in aligning themselves on the side of the shareholders.7   
While there is extensive evidence on the crucial role of outside directors, why do 
boards numerically dominated by inside directors, as in the case of Japan, still exist?  
Are reforms guiding Japanese corporations in the right direction by encouraging 
supermajority independent boards?   Based on the assumption that the presence of 
outside directors on corporate boards is an influential governance mechanism in 
protecting shareholders from expropriation, the second hypothesis predicts a positive 
association between outside directors on the board and firm performance.  By this, the 
aim is to determine whether or not corporate governance reforms should persistently 
encourage appointments of outside directors to corporate boards in Japan.   While Miwa 
and Ramseyer (2002) use the total number of outsiders on a board, this study examines 
the influence of a positive change in outside directors. 
HYPOTHESIS 2:  Firm performance should improve subsequent to a positive change in 
the number of outside director on the board. 
                                                 
7 See also Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Kini, Kracaw and Mian (1995). 
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3.3 HYPOTHESIS THREE 
 
Ownership structure, keiretsu, the main bank and board structure are unique 
aspects of Japanese businesses which affect corporate behavior.  While these features 
were vital to success in post-war catch up period in Japan, it is uncertain whether they 
were crucial for recovery during the implementation of economic and financial reforms 
in the 1990s.  The third hypothesis encompasses the effects of these attributes on 
turnover of board members.  The nature of president turnovers and the role of bank and 
corporate directors are also examined. 
In support of the view that keiretsu groups, main banks, large shareholders and 
outside directors play an important role in the Japanese corporate control system, the 
third hypothesis predicts these governance forces to influence board turnover in the 
event of poor firm performance.  To test for these corporate governance effects, 
variables representing keiretsu, main bank, ownership (BLOCK 2, BLOCK 3 and 
BLOCK 4), and outside director are also included in the 2SLS model.   
HYPOTHESIS 3:  Corporate governance forces, including keiretsu groups, main banks, 
ownership concentration, and outside directorship affect turnover of board members and 
firm performance.   
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1 DATA  
 
Data used for the empirical tests are mainly hand collected from several 
different sources.  The sample of Japanese companies used in this study is directly taken 
from the list of publicly traded Japanese companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Price 
Index (TOPIX) 150 Index.  The analyses in this study are limited to the 117 firms for 
which complete data is available.  Firms that are not listed are excluded because there 
are substantial difficulties obtaining data on unlisted Japanese firms.  Due to data 
availability, the sample period for analyses is restricted from 1989 to 2001.  However, 
while the sample period is restricted to 2001, it is relatively longer than that of related 
studies. 
The following definitions of the different variables used in this study are 
consistent with those of Kang and Shivdasani (1995).  Data on board directors is 
collected from Toyo Keizai’s Yakuin Shikiho,8 which surveys board composition by 
mailing questionnaires to all firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).  Data for 
all accounting variables are extracted from Thomson Financial Datastream. 
 Firm performance is measured using market adjusted stock returns based on the 
TOPIX 150 Index.  Stock return (R) is calculated using the following formula: 
  Rt = (Pt - Pt –1) / Pt –1             (1) 
                                                 
8 Toyo Keizai is a Japanese financial information company similar to Value-Line. 
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The market-adjusted return is defined as stock’s annual return less the return on the 
TOPIX150 Index.  Turnover rate is measured as the number of dismissals of board 
members during a calendar year divided by the number of board members in the 
previous year. 
Following Kaplan and Minton (1994), those few directors with previous 
experience at another firm are referred to as outsiders. The outside director variable is 
measured using a dummy variable that equals one when there is a positive change in the 
number of outsiders on the board, and zero otherwise. Appointments of outsiders are 
important because corporate reforms, such as the Corporate Governance Forum of 
Japan (CGFJ), place emphasis on the role of the outside director.  In Japanese firms, 
outsiders are rare and their appointments are generally considered an indication that the 
main bank or outside corporation is paying particular attention to the governance of the 
appointing firm.  Therefore, it is expected that a positive reaction to stock returns will 
be observed following an increase in the number of outside director on board. 
 Board size is the total number of directors on the board.  Like Morck and 
Nakamura (1999), statutory auditors are not considered a director in the analyses; 
therefore, they are not included when determining board size.  The auditors can attend, 
but cannot vote at, board meetings so they have less of an influential role on the boards.  
Morck and Nakamura (1999) also estimate the determinants of bank appointments and 
include statutory auditor appointments as director appointments.  They note, however, 
that they obtain similar results even when the auditors are excluded.  Following Kaplan 
and Minton (1994), board appointments of government officials and non-Japanese 
directors are excluded.  Retired government officials occasionally obtain board 
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positions in firms they previously regulated in Japan, which is a common practice 
known as a ‘descent from heaven’.  Since such appointments are generally considered 
rewards, they are not regarded as outside appointments.  Further, board appointments of 
non-Japanese directors are also excluded because they are unlikely to be part of the 
Japanese corporate governance system (Kaplan and Minton, 1994).  Yermack (1996) 
find a negative relationship between board size and firm valuation. Similarly, it is 
expected that such inverse relation should be observed. 
Keiretsu is also a dummy variable indicating industrial grouping membership, 
which equals one if a firm belongs to a keiretsu and zero otherwise.  Firms have 
keiretsu membership if they belong to the Big Six keiretsu.  Kang and Shivdasani 
(1995) experiment with alternative definitions of keiretsu membership in addition to the 
Big Six definition, such as the eight bank-centered groups (namely, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, Sanwa, Tokai, IBJ) and all seventeen industrial groups.  
Nonetheless, they obtain qualitatively identical results.  Data on keiretsu membership is 
collected from Toyo Keizai’s Kigyo Keiretsu Soran.  Therefore, if keiretsu is critical in 
the success of Japanese firms, keiretsu should be positively related to performance.   
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) adopt their classification of routine and non-routine 
turnover to be consistent with a previous study by Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988).  
Likewise, the same classification is used in this study, so forced departures should 
increase when firm performance deteriorates, while routine turnover occurs is not 
expected to affect performance.  Non-routine turnover refers to turnover events where 
the president does not remain on the board of directors, while routine turnover refers to 
turnovers where the president remains on the board. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) 
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comment that as with all such classifications, the distinction between routine and non-
routine turnover is probably imperfect.  For instance, some incidents of non-routine 
turnover events could be planned retirements and is unrelated to performance.  Kang 
and Shivdasani (1995) obtain similar results when an alternative classification method 
is employed.  That is, defining a non-routine turnover to include all cases where the 
president does not become chairman of the board.  However, they comment that 
coefficients are not estimated as precisely using the latter definition.    
The bank relation variable is also a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has 
ties to a main bank, zero otherwise.  A firm is considered to have ties with a main bank 
if the firm’s largest lender is also the firm’s largest shareholder.  Data on lendings and 
equity ownership are obtained from annual issues of Kigyo Keiretsu Soran.  If main 
banks are significantly less influential on corporate matters, a connection between bank 
ties and firm performance will not be observed.   
The ownership variable depicts the percentage of shares owned by the top ten 
shareholders.  This variable is furthered defined using four dummy variables that relate 
to the percentage of equity held by the firm’s top ten shareholders:  BLOCK 1 equals 
one if the top ten shareholders own less than 31%; BLOCK 2 equals one if ownership 
by the ten largest shareholders is between 31% and 35%; BLOCK 3 equals one if 
ownership is between 35% and 41%; and BLOCK 4 equals one if ownership is greater 
than 41%.  The choice of 31%, 35% and 41% reflects the fact that these are the 25th, 
50th, and 75th percentiles of the distribution of block ownership.  Data on ownership 
structure is obtained from Kigyo Keiretsu Soran.  Since ownership is highly 
concentrated in Japan and there is an absence of managerial entrenchment, it is 
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suspected that higher concentration levels are associated with better performance as 
theory predicts (Morck et al, 2003).    
Prior to Japan’s economic turndown, close bank-firm ties fuelled remarkable 
growth of the Japanese firms by ensuring a stable supply of credit to troubled 
companies.  However, effects of this close relationship turned to a liability during 
Japan’s domestic banking crisis.  Thus, leverage is also a measure of the strength of the 
bank-firm relationship in Japan and is the average debt ratio calculated as long-term 
debt over assets.  Similar to the main bank variable, leverage should be negatively 
related to performance.  Firm size is also considered in the analyses and is measured as 
natural logarithm of average annual sales.  Since executives at larger firms are able to 
find alternative employment opportunities more easily than their counterparts at small 
firms, turnover should increase with firm size.   
Director appointments are further defined based on previous employment 
experiences and are measured using dummy variables.  Directors with bank experience 
are classified as bank directors, and those with corporate experience are defined as 
corporate directors.  If the two types of directors serve different purposes, a distinct 
pattern in relation to performance ought to be detected in the analysis. 
Problems of joint endogeneity are prevalent in empirical studies on board 
directors and corporate governance.  Almost all of the variables of interest are 
endogenous.  For example, changes in board structure affect firm performance and 
corporate governance attributes, in turn, may influence shifts in board members.  Thus, 
it is uncertain whether a firm’s performance is affected by board changes or by 
governance features such as the presence of an outside director. 
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Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) observe that firm performance is affected by 
actions of previous board directors and, itself, is a factor that can exert influence in the 
appointment of subsequent directors.  McConnell (2003) also provides an example of 
this problem.  He suggests that it is unclear whether an action taken by the board occurs 
because the board is dominated by outside directors, or whether market forces dictate 
board composition, recognizing that a particular action will be appropriate at some time 
in the future.  Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) detect an 
increased likelihood of outside director appointments to the board when firms under 
perform.  If both top executive turnover and outside director appointments follow poor 
performance, failing to account for this endogeneity problem can result in a spurious 
relation between top executive turnover and the presence of outside directors on the 
board.  An approach used to mitigate this endogeneity problem is to use lagged 
variables (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001).  For example, the outside director is lagged 
by two years for analysis in this study.  Firm performance is considered in this 
relationship as it is expected to affect both variables simultaneously.  Without a lagged 
variable, it is uncertain whether there is a relationship between outside directors and 
president turnover, or if it is poor firm performance that leads to this spurious 
relationship.  Therefore, using lagged outside director values should yield more reliable 
results since the value of outside directors is already determined.   
4.2 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
 Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) survey the empirical literature on corporate 
boards and find that this strand of research can be classified as estimating one or more 
of the following equations in the system: 
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   at+s = фct + εt                       (2) 
pt+s = βat + ηt                       (3) 
 
ct+s = µpt + ξt                       (4) 
 
where a denotes an action , board turnover for example, c denotes characteristics, such 
as composition or size of the board,  p denotes firm performance, t indexes time (s > 0), 
ф, β, and µ are parameters to be estimated, and ε, η, and ξ denote the rest of the 
specification plus errors.  In cases where the entire system is not estimated 
simultaneously, the joint endogeneity problem is tackled using lags (i.e., s > 0).  
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) further suggest that it is possible to directly study the 
relationship between board characteristics and firm performance by combining the first 
two equations, which forms: 
pt+s = β(фct + εt ) + ηt           (5) 
 
where Pt is the price of the shares in  t.  This study uses the approach as defined in 
equation four to correct for endogeneity problems amongst variables.  Figure 1 presents 
a graphic illustration of these four equations. 
 The models proposed to test the first hypothesis have the following forms: 
Turnover = β0 + β1Performance t –i + ε                             (6) 
 
Performance = β0 + β1Turnover t –i + ε                   (7) 
 
The second hypothesis predicts a relationship between the presence of outside 
directors on corporate boards and firm performance, which is characterized by the 
following equation: 
Performance = β0 + β1 Change in Outside Directors t –2 + ε                 (8) 
 
Board size is also regressed on performance using the pooled OLS model: 
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Performance = β0 + β1 Number of Directors t –2 + ε                   (9)   
The model proposed to test the third hypothesis is estimated using the two stage 
least squares method in equation 4 (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001).  This estimator 
accounts for the effects of key governance variables in Japanese firms, including 
keiretsu membership, outside directorship, main bank relations, firm size and 
ownership.   
As discussed, it is expected that board turnover affects performance and 
corporate governance attributes, in turn, initiates board rotation.  However, governance 
mechanisms also affect the performance of firms, so the 2SLS method should be 
applied to these relationships. 
As depicted by equation 1, the following model is estimated: 
Board Turnover = β0 + β1Outside director t –2  + β2Directors t –2   + β3 
Leverage t–2  + β4Firm Size + β5Keiretsu + β6Block2 t –2  + β7Block3 t –2   + 
β8 Block4 t–2  + β9 Ownership t–2   + ε                                                  (10) 
Using the simultaneous equations approach suggested by Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2001), the two-stage least square (2SLS) method is applied to study the 
effects of board turnover and Japanese governance characteristics on performance9: 
Performance = ƒ (board turnover  (outside director t –2, board size t –2, firm 
size t –2, keiretsu t –2, block 2 t –2, block 3 t –2, block 4 t –2, leverage t –2, 
ownership by 10 largest shareholders t –2))                      (11) 
The nature of president turnover is also examined by classifying the dismissal of 
presidents as routine or non-routine.  Because the dependent variables include only 
                                                 
9 performance=f (board actions(board composition)) , board action=f (board composition), 
 performance =(board actions)   
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binary data, the logit model is best suited as an estimator.  Replacements of board 
directors are also further defined to identify the background of the director.  Those with 
banking experience are bank directors while others without such experience are 
classified as corporate directors.  The following equations depict these models: 
Probability (routine turnover) = ƒ (firm performance t–2)                 (12)  
Probability (nonroutine turnover) = ƒ (firm performance t–2)               (13) 
The models involving the background of the director are depicted as follows:  
Probability (appointment of corporate director) = ƒ(performance t–2, 
leverage t–2, ownership t–2, keiretsu t–2)                            (14) 
Probability (appointment of bank director) = ƒ(performance t–2, leverage 
t–2, ownership t–2, keiretsu t–2)               (15) 
4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on ownership and board composition 
variables for the 117 firms as of the beginning of the sample period.  In the sample, 43.6 
percent of the firms belong to a keiretsu.  This figure is roughly 5 percent lower than the 
percentage reported by Kang and Shivdasani (1995) for the fiscal year-end 1984.  
Equivalent to the statistic reported in the previous study, 18 percent of the firms have 
ties to a main bank according to the definition in which the dummy variable equals one 
if the firm’s largest lender is also the firm’s largest shareholder and 71 percent if the 
alternate definition is used10.  Equity ownership by the top ten shareholders remains 
about the same, averaging 37.9 percent.  Surprisingly, the number of directors serving 
on the boards averages 27, which is 2 greater than previously reported.   Boards have an 
                                                 
10 Dummy variable equals one if the firm’s largest lender is also a blockholder. 
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average of 2 outside directors and the maximum number of outside directors in the 
sample is 13.  There appears to be a drastic increase in the fraction of firms with an 
outside director.  71 percent of the sample firms have an outside director on the board 
while this statistic was reported to be 38 percent for 1984.  Mean turnover rate is 0.18 
for this sample and the standard deviation is small, 0.121, for this statistic.  This 
suggests that there may not be much variation in board turnover. 
Table 2 documents the extent of president turnover in the sample of Japanese 
firms.  There are a total of 150 turnover events in 936 firm-years.  Turnover appears to 
be evenly concentrated throughout the sample period.  By examining the president’s 
subsequent employment with the company, it is possible to gain insight into the nature 
of turnover.  105 presidents, representing 70 percent of the turnover events, remain in 
the corporation as the chairman of the board.  In 24 instances, the former president 
remains on the board in a capacity other than the chairman, often as either a vice-
chairman of the board or in an advisory position.  In the remaining 21 instances, the 
president is no longer on the board of directors.  Therefore, 86% of president turnover is 
routine, while 14% is non-routine.   
The correlation matrix in Table 3 describes pair-wise correlations among key 
variables in the dataset.  To avoid a multicollinearity problem, a conservative approach 
is used to examine whether or not the variables are highly correlated.11  Observing no 
pairs of variables with correlation coefficients values greater than the criterion, results 
in this study should not be obscured by the problem of multicollinearity.   
 
 
                                                 
11 A variable with a correlation coefficient greater than R=0.9 is removed from the equation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 5.1 BOARD TURNOVER AND PERFORMANCE 
 
The roles of board of directors in the Japanese system of corporate governance 
are studied.  Tables 4 and 5 present the results for hypothesis 1, which establishes a 
negative relationship between board turnover and performance two years prior to 
turnover.  This suggests that poor performance triggers turnover of board members in 
the sample period.  Results here are similar to findings of Warner et al. (1988), who find 
a significant relationship between a company’s performance and the probability of 
management turnover for a sample of U.S. companies.  This is an indication that 
corporate board turnover is a determinant of this aspect of corporate governance.  
Surprisingly, the expected positive relationship between board rotation and 
performance does not occur, neither one nor two years, subsequent to board turnover.  
A possible explanation is that under traditional Japanese governance practices, 
promotions are based on seniority, so the new directors may not necessarily 
demonstrate superior performance than the dismissed.  Also, the model could not 
capture dismissals due to retirements which could also affect results.  Another possible 
interpretation is that since the variance for turnover rate is extremely small, impact on 
performance is also minimal therefore minimal. 
To capture the effects of market-wide shocks on performance, the pooled OLS 
models were also estimated including year dummies.  However, including year 
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dummies to the model did not significantly change regression results in the analyses so 
the latter results are not reported. 
5.2 OUTSIDE DIRECTORS AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 Table 6 present the results for the second hypothesis proposed.  Here, the 
significance of a positive change in outside directors serving on corporate boards is 
tested.  Is there really value in appointing an outside director to the board in Japan?  
Like models from hypothesis one, the model in which firm performance is lagged two 
periods exhibits stronger overall effects on the presence of outside directors than the 
model using firm performance lagged by one period.    
Reformists persistently encourage adding outside directors to boards to mirror 
US governance practices.  Prior studies have provided evidence that adding an outsider 
to a board produces significant positive stock price reaction (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 
1990).  However, results here show the contrary.  A positive change in outside directors 
does not necessarily yield positive stock price reactions.  The finding here is consistent 
with that of Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) who argue that outsiders are not significant.  
Outside directors are generally thought to bring benefits to the firm, but they do come at 
cost.  While they are independent from everyone else in the firm, outside directors 
generally know little about the firm’s dynamics.  Thus, outside directors trade 
independence for expertise and are much less influential in Japanese firms.   
5.3 BOARD SIZE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
Lack of independence and unwieldy size of Japanese boards have been a 
particular focus for researchers of Japanese corporate governance.  Reducing the size of 
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Japanese corporate boards is also an objective of governance reforms in Japan. 12  
Regression results on Table 7 support the traditional view that smaller board companies 
tend to outperform firms with larger boards.    For example, Yermack (1996) provide 
evidence that smaller boards have a higher Tobin’s Q.   The intuition is that the ability 
of the board to control management declines since problems of co-ordination and 
communication increase with larger boards; therefore, the board becomes less efficient.  
Further, agency problems, such as director free-riding, increase when boards become 
too big.  In which case, the boards become more symbolic and neglect its monitoring 
and control duties. 
5.4 KEY GOVERNANCE FEATURES AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 Table 8 presents results for the initial stage of the two-stage least squares model 
estimating the relation between key governance characteristics on board turnover and 
performance.  Specifically, the first stage of this model examines whether governance 
characteristics drive corporate board turnover.  Board size, leverage, and ownership 
initiate changes in board members.  It is evident that turnover of corporate board 
members increase with smaller boards.  This is consistent with the traditional view that 
smaller boards are more efficient.   
Leverage is also negatively related. Recall that leverage is a measure of firm-
bank relationship.  Therefore, dismissals are less likely for firms with closer 
connections with main banks.  This could be an indication that the governance power of 
the main bank serves to protect dismissals of under-performing directors.  Hiraki et al. 
(2003) report negative significance between bank borrowing and firm value.  This is 
due to several limitations of this main bank system.  Cost of capital for bank firms is 
                                                 
12 Sony, for example, reduced its board size from 38 to 10 in 1997.   
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higher than non-bank firms and there is a weak association between profitability and 
growth with main bank firms.  Thus, the negative relation reflects on the notion that 
alternative measures, other than bank oversight, are necessary.  While main banks were 
critical in the success of Japanese firms in the post-war era, it appears that they are 
becoming less influential during the height of reforms in the 1990s.   
The block ownership variables, which displayed minimal significance in the late 
1980s (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995), appear insignificant throughout the 1990s.  
Variables representing quartiles of block ownerships display no significance, while 
turnover is more likely when ownership by the top then shareholders is high.   
Finding significance in the ownership variable suggests the existence of some 
managerial entrenchment in Japan.  For example, Claessens and Fan (2002) report that 
high ownership concentration is associated with higher risk of expropriation.  
Significance of the ownership variable is consistent with the conventional view that 
concentrated ownership improves performance by imposing a higher degree of 
monitoring and alleviating problems arising from conflict of interests between share 
holders and managers.  Morck et al. (2003) find that the level of director ownership is 
positively associated with Tobin Q. 
Table 9 presents results for the second stage of the 2SLS estimation, which is 
used as an estimator for analyzing the significance of and board turnover on 
performance in the presence of corporate governance variables.  As expected, results 
show a significant inverse relation between board turnover and past performance.  
Therefore, in the presence of governance variables, poor performance triggers turnover 
of board members.  Viewed together, the two-stage least squares model shows to be an 
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effective estimator in identifying key governance determinants of the board turnover-
performance relationship13.   
5.5 NATURE OF TURNOVER 
 
 To gain insight into the nature of turnovers on corporate boards, departures of 
presidents are examined to determine whether the departure was forced or voluntary.  
Moreover, the role of bank versus corporate directors is also examined in the remaining 
tests.   
5.5.1 Presidency Turnover 
 
Table 10 presents results for the two types of president turnovers.  Contrary to 
expectations and earlier literature, such as that presented by Kang and Shivdasani 
(1995), non-routine turnover of presidents is not associated with performance.  A 
possible explanation for this finding is that the board of directors still serves at the 
discretion of the president.  Under the traditional Japanese corporate governance model, 
the president, who is usually the retired president or retired executive of a parent 
company, still selects the president’s successor and promotions are based on seniority.  
As such, the appointed president is unlikely to be a better representative of the 
shareholders, and may not play much of a monitoring role in disciplining and 
monitoring senior management.   
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) document the annual likelihood of non-routine 
president turnover is 3.1 percent.  Other papers estimate it at less than 5 percent so it 
seems hard to argue such an infrequent event alone to be the main corporate governance 
                                                 
13 The significance of the 2SLS regression is evaluated using the F-statistic, which is 12.23 for which the 
p-value is 0.0005. 
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mechanism in Japan.  As hypothesized, other key attributes of Japanese corporate 
governance should also be accounted for when analyzing the firms’ financial standings. 
Routine turnover also show no significance in this specification.  As expected, it 
is the usual standard for Japanese presidents to resign their presidencies at regular 
intervals without regard to performance14.  Therefore, standard presidential turnover 
may not be disciplinary in any real sense.       
5.5.2 Bank and Corporate Directors 
 
Since the roles of banks are changing, it is of particular interest to determine 
whether appointed directors are affiliated with banks.  Table 11 shows results for the 
regressions estimating the relationship between appointments of bank and corporate 
directors and firm performance and key corporate governance variables measuring the 
intensity of the relationships governing Japanese firms15.  Regardless of the background 
of the appointed director, they are both unrelated to stock return and ownership 
variables.   
Both types of director appointments relate to leverage.  Since leverage is a 
relationship measure of the firm-bank relation, the negative association with bank 
director appointments indicates that appointments of bank directors are less likely for 
firms with closer bank ties.  This suggests that the role of banks and bank directors are 
changing and becoming less influential.  On the other hand, higher leverage increases 
likelihood of a corporate director.  This observation is unexpected because under 
traditional Japanese corporate governance, main banks normally send their 
                                                 
14 It is also common that the president usually becomes the chairman or retains his representative rights 
after resigning presidency in Japanese firms. 
15 Kaplan and Minton (1994) find that appointments of both types of directors increase significantly with 
poor stock performance. 
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representatives to their client firms.  However, it is now evident that corporate directors 
are appointments are more likely when firms have closer relations to the bank.  
Keiretsu almost always involve bank leadership and this relation is evident here 
as firms belonging in a keiretsu increase the likelihood of bank director appointments. 
Kaplan and Minton (1994) document contrasting results for Japanese firms 
during the 1980s.  Their results show that firm performance affect the likelihood of 
bank and corporate director appointments and find a distinct pattern in governance 
variables between the two types of director appointments.  The differences in 
relationship measures suggest that the two types of appointments serve different 
purposes and protect different interests. They reason that corporate appointments are 
meant to protect or support the main shareholders and, unlike bank appointments, are 
not intended to protect the main bank nor inter-corporate shareholdings.   
Viewed together, these results suggest that the role of banks has changed since 
the booming 80s as a distinct pattern in governance variables affecting the probabilities 
of each type of director appointment is not observed.  Therefore, these findings are not 
consistent with the notion that different types of appointments serve different purposes. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Japan has confronted problems of economic and political transformation 
throughout the 1990s, which have raised deep concerns regarding Japanese corporate 
governance.  The extent to which Japanese policy makers should adopt US governance 
practices has been sharply contested.  In this study, the key proposed changes to 
corporate boards are analyzed to determine their significance in relation to stock 
returns.  Primarily, downsizing corporate boards and increasing board independence.  In 
addition, governance characteristics including board size, ownership, firm size, main 
bank and keiretsu relations are considered key determinants of the board turnover-
performance relationship. 
6.1 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
While related studies have focused on appointments of CEOs, existing literature 
is short on analysis of the effects of changes of the entire board in relation to 
governance attributes and firm performance, especially outside US.  This study is 
unique in that it explores the factors driving board rotation and firm performance and 
how important the key governance features have been over the past decade, with the 
remarkable amount of corporate law reform and the increasing pace of corporate 
governance reform in Japan.  Recent US corporate scandals have produced a different 
perspective on the extent to which Japanese corporations should transform corporate 
governance practices and has raised uncertainties in this regard.  Firms in Japan now 
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have the option to maintain the traditional Japanese board or to adopt the US type of 
board.   
Analyzing the relationship between board turnover and corporate governance 
mechanism on firm performance reveals both positive and negative effects of 
convergence to the US style of corporate governance.  For instance, while some 
proposals (such as downsizing boards) are effective, some may even be counter-
effective.  For example, there is still uncertainty as to whether a supermajority 
independent board will necessarily improve overall performance.  This raises concerns 
regarding regulatory reforms which promote outsider dominated boards.  The presence 
of even just one truly independent director on the board means that the president would 
have to explain all matters. 
While close bank ties fuelled impressive growth of the Japanese economy by 
ensuring a stable supply of credit after World War II, it turned into a liability during the 
domestic banking crisis.  Results in this study suggest that the roles of the main bank 
and directors are changing and becoming less influential than before.       
Related studies estimate president turnover, corporate governance mechanisms 
and performance using OLS or binary models; however, a similar relation is estimated 
using the two-stage least squares model to correct for endogeneity problems in this 
study.  Also, the majority of the related studies are on US firms, while this study 
focuses on Japanese firms governed by a unique system of control.  The 2SLS model 
shows to be an effective tool in estimating the relation between turnover and 
performance in the presence of corporate governance variables.  It can be deducted from 
results of this model that smaller boards are indeed more efficient than larger boards.  
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As well, firms with less connection with banks outperform those with higher reliance on 
leverage.  Finally, a significant relation is observed between ownership level of 
Japanese firms and board turnover.   
Test on the nature of turnover yield interesting results.  Contrary to expectations, 
results show no connection between presidency turnover (routine or non-routine) and 
firm performance.  This is an implication that the president does not solely assume 
responsibility for the firm’s performance.  Finally, appointments of bank and corporate 
directors are both significantly unrelated to firm performance.  As it is suspected that 
the role of the bank and corporate director differs, this no longer is the case.  The two 
types of appointments appear to serve the same purpose and the role of the bank 
director has become comparably less influential since the 1980s.   
Finally, while there is a strong association between poor performance and 
turnover of board members, such relationship is not observed for president turnovers.  
An important implication of this finding is that the entire board, rather than the 
president alone, assumes responsibility for performance in Japanese corporations.  
Weak relationships in this study could be an indication that Japanese firms do 
not necessarily have to converge to the US style of corporate control in order to achieve 
superior performances.  Instead, firms should establish a system of management, which 
adequately respects the signals arising from shareholders and adjust with the changing 
features of the system and improve firm performance to a greater extent. 
6.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
  The present study is only a preliminary step in investigating board rotation and 
governance attributes based on reform recommendations.  Japan’s corporate control 
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system is indeed extensive and complex.  This represents a challenging task for 
research.  There are several limitations that should be acknowledged in this study.  First 
of all, the analyses cannot go beyond 2001 due to data availability.  Due to data 
limitations, director age and retirements were not controlled for in the analyses.   
Further, weak results in this study also depict that the notion of directors as monitors is 
too simplistic.  Issues dealing with inner workings of the board, such as the board-CEO 
relationship, complicate the modeling problem.  Moreover, group decision-making and 
the behavior of small groups of individuals could also alter the model as the individuals 
appear to be governed by issues of emotions, fairness and norm adherent.   
However, while these are shortcomings in this study, they can be seen as fruitful 
avenues for future research under the same theme. 
6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
Even though it is evident that some of the corporate governance reforms are 
effective during the 1990s, analysis stretching beyond the end of the sample period in 
this study will inevitably provide a much deeper perspective of the evolving corporate 
system in Japan.  For example, it could be possible to determine how much of the 
economic crisis is firm-specific, and how much is due to overall economic problems by 
analyzing these effects under different economic conditions.  While evidence supports 
the notion that smaller boards are more effective, how small should corporate boards 
be?   What is the optimal board structure?  The extent to which the boards will change 
remains an open question, as new standards of corporate governance are yet to take 
shape.   
Overall, in examining the relationship between governance attributes, board 
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composition and firm performance using a system of equations, and finding a 
significant relationship between turnover of the entire board and firm performance, this 
study makes two significant contributions to Japanese corporate governance literature.   
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APPENDIX A: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM OF 
JAPAN 
In November 1994, The Corporate Governance Forum of Japan was formally 
inaugurated.  The committee for the Settlement of Corporate governance principles 
comprises of seventeen participants drawn from members representing corporate 
executives, institutional investors, law and economics academics, the mass media and 
lawyers.  The forum decided to draw up and propose its Corporate Governance 
Principles for Japan with the belief that these Principles would be a formula for 
realizing effective corporate governance.  The Japanese Corporate Governance 
Committee revised the Principles in May 26, 1998 and after 31 meetings, they were 
revised once again in October 26, 2001.  The Committee revised the first version of the 
Principles by integrating these discussions, including the appointment of outside 
directors who are professors at national universities and certain revisions to the 
Commercial Code16.  
The document offers sixteen ideas for modernizing the governance of Japanese 
corporations so that they become more competitive in the global market. These 
principles focus on the rights of shareholders, disclosure and transparency, and the 
responsibilities of the board of directors.  A primary principle is to rejuvenate the board 
of director structure within the Japanese corporation and firmly establish it as the 
guardian of corporate governance in Japan.  More specifically, they attempt to establish 
an independent system of outside directors in Japan, and by establishing a market for 
independent directors to promote the transferability of corporate executives between 
companies.    
                                                 
16 See Hashimoto (2002) for the list of commercial code revisions. 
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The principles are designed as a two-step formula (Step A and Step B) for 
realizing effective corporate governance.  “Step A Principles” are those that should be 
adopted as soon as possible, except parts of principles that are along with legal reforms.  
“Step B Principles” are those, which should be aimed for in the 21st century, and are 
necessary with amendments to promote market globalization, or which require legal 
reforms on a grand scale. 
Of the sixteen principles, the Governance Structure principles are most closely 
related to the issues discussed in this study.   Governance structure principles state that 
the board of directors should include independent, non-executive directors who have 
no direct interests in the company.  In addition, the number of directors should be 
appropriate to guarantee effective discussion at board-level, and enhance articulate and 
timely corporate decision-making.  Principle 8A states that the board of directors 
should consist of both executive directors and independent, non-executive directors.  
Independent, non-executive directors should comprise a majority on the board.  A 
question raised here is, whether or not this majority is optimal for corporate boards in 
Japan.  Principles regulating accountability and disclosure, corporate auditors and the 
board of corporate auditors, as well as shareholders’ meetings were also included in 
the forum’s proposal17.     
Important longer-term reforms proposed by the Corporate Governance Forum of 
Japan include a majority of independent, non-executive directors on corporate boards 
and the implementation of special board committees including nominating and 
remuneration committees comprised of a majority of independent directors. 
 
                                                 
17 See “Corporate Governance Principles (Final Report)” for detailed descriptions of each Principle. 
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Figure 1: An illustration of the joint endogeneity problem influencing empirical work 
on boards of directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M., 2001: Boards of Directors as an 
Endogenously Determined Institution:  A Survey of the Economic Literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics on financial and governance characteristics 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms listed on TOPIX 150.  
Descriptive Statistics presented is as of fiscal year-end 1991. 
Characteristic Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
First 
Quartile Median Third Quartile
Book value of 
assets (¥ 
million) 1,679,002,126
 
1,435,270,009 337,699,488 856,751,616 1,859,391,696
Sales (¥ 
million) 2,152,440,640 4,216,633,728 348,329,344 809,184,768 1,789,602,304
Market Value 
of Equity (¥ 
million) 1,025,062 854,458 371,000 744,972 1,194,493
Fraction of 
firms 
belonging to a 
keiretsu 0.436    
Fraction of 
firms with a 
main bank 
relation 0.18*/.71**    
Equity 
ownership by 
top ten 
shareholders 0.379 9.831 0.32 0.361 0.42
Number of 
directors 26.87 10.161 20 26 32
Number of 
outside 
directors 2
2.378
0 1 3
Maximum 
number of 
outside 
directors 13
Fraction of 
firms with an 
outside 
director 0.71       
Turnover Rate 0.136 0.097    
*Applying the definition in which the dummy variable =1 if firm's largest lender is also the firm's largest 
shareholder, 0 otherwise. 
** Applying the definition in which the dummy variable =1 if biggest lender is also a blockholder, 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2   
Frequency of president turnover, classified by year and type of turnover 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms listed on TOPIX 150.  Data 
presented is as of fiscal year 1991.  Turnover occurs between 1991 and 1999.  Turnover 
frequencies are determined from Yakuin Shikiho (Seasonal Corporate News).   
Type of Turnover 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
President loses 
position but stays on 
board as chairman 13 12 11 8 12 15 8 10 16 105
President loses 
position but stays on 
the board in capacity 
other than chairman 0 4 4 1 4 2 2 3 4 24
President loses 
position and does not 
remain on the board 1 2 7 0 0 2 1 4 4 21
All turnover events 14 18 22 9 16 19 11 17 24 150
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix: pair-wise correlations among variables in the dataset 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Price Index (TOPIX) 150 Index over the period 1991 to 2001.  Performance is 
measured using market adjusted stock returns based on the TOPIX 150 Index.  Board 
turnover is measured as the dismissals of board members during a calendar year divided by 
the total number board members in the previous year.  Keiretsu is a binary variable that 
equals one if the firm belongs to a keiretsu.  Leverage is long-term debt ratio to total 
assets.Outside director dummy equals one if there is a positive change in the number of 
outside directors, zero otherwise.  Board size is the total number of directors, excluding  
auditors, on a board.  Firm size is the natural logarithm of average annual sales. BLOCK2 
equals one if ownership by the firm’s ten largest shareholders exceeds 32% but less than 
36%.  BLOCK3 equals one if ownership by the firm’s ten largest shareholders exceeds 36% 
but less than 42%.  BLOCK4 equals one if ownership by the firm’s ten largest shareholders 
exceeds 42%.    Directors previously employed by a nonfinancial corporation are classified 
as corporate directors and those with banking experience are bank directors.  Turnover is 
termed non-routine if the president does not remain on the board of directors. Turnover is 
termed routine if the president remains on the board of directors.    Ownership is the 
percentage of shares owned by the ten larges shareholders.  A variable with a correlation 
coefficient greater than 0.9, is removed from the equation 
 
 
 
 Performance Turnover Keiretsu Leverage Outside 
Director
Board 
Size 
Block2 
Performance 1.0000 -0.0151 -0.1070 -0.1409 -0.0037 -0.1256 -0.0321 
Turnover  1.0000 0.0923 0.1382 -0.0018 -0.1094 0.0014 
Keiretsu   1.0000 0.1116 0.0055 0.3011 0.0237 
Leverage    1.0000 0.2178 0.2619 -0.0108 
Outside 
Director 
    1.0000 0.0036 -0.0615 
Board Size      1.0000 0.1103 
Block2       1.0000 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix: pair-wise correlations among variables in the dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Block3 Block4 Bank 
Director
Corporate 
Director 
Non-
routine 
Turnover
Routine 
Turnover 
Ownership
Performance 0.0626 0.0773 0.0251 -0.0077 0.0001 -0.0364 0.1461 
Turnover -0.0164 -0.0990 
 
0.0161 0.0202 -0.0114 -0.0851 -0.0953 
Keiretsu -0.0009 -0.0645 0.0339 0.0082 -0.0182 0.0622 -0.1235 
Leverage -0.0898 -0.2293 -0.0611 0.0327 0.0603 0.0871 -0.3368 
Outside 
Director 
0.0217 0.0031 0.1534 0.2516 0.0136 0.0112 -0.0416 
Board Size -0.1101 -0.2630 0.0710 0.1340 -0.0284 0.0860 -0.3035 
Block2 -0.3613 -0.2826 0.0100 -0.0288 -0.0023 0.0026 -0.2052 
Block3 1.0000 -0.3146 -0.0118 0.0379 -0.0154 -0.0384 0.1051 
Block4  1.0000 0.0274 0.0083 -0.0196 -0.0253 0.7812 
Bank 
Director 
  1.0000 0.4540 0.0007 0.0504 0.0102 
Corporate 
Director 
   1.0000 -0.0004 0.0342 0.0397 
Non-routine 
Turnover 
    1.0000 -0.0566 -0.0227 
Routine 
Turnover 
     1.0000 -0.0564 
Ownership       1.0000 
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Table 4 
Pooled least squares regression estimates of performance on board turnover 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Price Index (TOPIX) 150 Index over the period 1991 to 1999.  Firm 
performance is measured using market-adjusted stock returns based on the TOPIX 150 
Index. Performance is computed over one and two fiscal years prior to board turnover.  
Board turnover is measured as the dismissals of board members during a calendar year 
divided by the number of board members in the previous year.  Sample sizes vary due to 
missing data.  P-values for the two-tailed tests are in parenthesis. 
 
Estimated 
Model: 
Board Turnover = β0 + 
β1Performancet-1 + ε 
Board Turnover = β0 + 
β1Performancet-2 + ε 
 
Intercept 
 
 
0.0.150*** 
(<0.0001) 
 
0.162***  
(<0.0001) 
 
Performance 
 
 
No. of Observations 
 
 
0.0176 
(0.4331) 
 
935 
 
-0.099*** 
(0.0002) 
 
818 
 
Adjusted R2 -0.0004 0.0161 
    *p < 0.10 
  **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69
Table 5 
Pooled least squares regression estimates of board turnover on performance 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Price Index (TOPIX) 150 Index over the period 1991 to 1999.  Performance is 
measured using market-adjusted stock returns based on the TOPIX 150 Index. Board 
turnover is computed over one and two fiscal years prior to firm performance.   Board 
turnover is measured as the dismissals of board members during a calendar year divided 
by the number of board members in the previous year.    Sample sizes vary due to 
missing data.  P-values for the two-tailed tests are in parenthesis. 
 
Estimated 
Model: 
Performance = β0 + β1Board 
Turnovert-1 + ε 
Performance = β0 + β1Board 
Turnovert-2 + ε 
 
Intercept 
 
 
0.022 
(0.308) 
 
0.006  
(0.798) 
 
Board Turnover 
 
 
No. of Observations 
 
 
-0.063 
(0.606) 
 
936 
 
0.045 
(0.755) 
 
819 
 
Adjusted R2 -0.0008 -0.001 
 *p < 0.10 
 **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
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Table 6 
Pooled least squares regression estimates of a positive change in the number of outside 
director on performance 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Price Index (TOPIX) 150 Index as of August 1, 2002.  Performance is 
measured using market-adjusted stock returns based on the TOPIX 150 Index. Outside 
director dummy equals 1 if there is a positive change in the number of outside directors, 
zero otherwise.  Outside director variable computed over one and two fiscal years prior to 
performance.  Sample sizes vary due to missing data.  P-values for the two-tailed tests are 
in parenthesis. 
 
Estimated 
Model: 
Performance = β0 + β1Outside 
Directort-1 + ε 
Performance = β0 + β1Outside 
Directort-2 + ε 
 
Intercept 
 
 
0.017 
(0.4965) 
 
0.019 
(0.517) 
 
Outside Director 
 
 
No. of Observations 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.860) 
 
936 
 
-0.009 
(0.788) 
 
819 
 
Adjusted R2 -0.001 -0.0011 
    *p < 0.10 
  **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
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Table 7 
Pooled least squares regression estimates of board size on performance 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Price Index (TOPIX) 150 Index over the period 1989 to 2001.  Performance is 
measured using market-adjusted stock returns based on the TOPIX 150 Index.  Board 
size variable is computed over one and two fiscal years prior to Performance.  Board size 
is the total number of directors, excluding auditors, on a board.  Sample sizes vary due to 
missing data.  P-values for the two-tailed tests are in parenthesis. 
 
Estimated 
Model: 
Performance = β0 + β1Board 
Sizet-1 + ε 
Performance = β0 + β1 Board 
Sizet-2 + ε 
 
Intercept 
 
 
0.183*** 
(<0.0001) 
 
0.207*** 
(<0.0001) 
 
Director 
 
 
No. of Observations 
 
 
-0.006*** 
(<0.0001) 
 
936 
 
-0.007*** 
(<0.0001) 
 
819 
 
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.025 
    *p < 0.10 
  **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
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Table 8 
First-stage regression results of the two-stage least squares estimates of board turnover 
and corporate governance attributes on performance 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Price Index (TOPIX) 150 Index over the period 1991 to 2001.  Performance is 
measured using market adjusted stock returns based on the TOPIX 150 Index. Board 
turnover is measured as the dismissals of board members during a calendar year divided 
by the number of board members in the previous year.  Outside director dummy equals 
one if there is a positive change in the number of outside directors, zero otherwise.  Board 
size is the total number of directors, excluding auditors, on a board.  Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of average annual sales.  Keiretsu is a binary variable that equals one if 
the firm belongs to a keiretsu.  BLOCK2 equals one if ownership by the firm’s ten largest 
shareholders exceeds 32% but less than 36%.  BLOCK3 equals one if ownership by the 
firm’s ten largest shareholders exceeds 36% but less than 42%.  BLOCK4 equals one if 
ownership by the firm’s ten largest shareholders exceeds 42%.  Leverage is long-term 
debt ratio to total assets.  Ownership is the percentage of shares owned by the ten larges 
shareholders.  Explanatory variables are lagged by 2 years.  P-values for the two-tailed 
tests are in parenthesis.   
 
Estimated Model: Performance =ƒ (board turnover  (outside director t –2, board size t –2, firm 
size t –2, keiretsu t –2, block 2 t –2, block 3 t –2, block 4 t –2,leverage t –2, ownership –2)) 
First Stage Regression Statistics  
Intercept -0.235 
(0.507) 
Outside Director 0.021 
(0.557) 
Board Size -0.005** 
(0.026) 
Firm Size 0.009 
(0.644) 
Keiretsu -0.044 
(0.201) 
Leverage -0.261** 
(0.021) 
Block 2 -0.028 
(0.584) 
Block 3 -0.032 
(0.601) 
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Table 8 
First-stage regression results of the two-stage least squares estimates of board turnover 
and corporate governance attributes on performance 
 
    *p < 0.10 
  **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimated Model: Performance =ƒ (board turnover  (outside director t –2, board size t –2, firm 
size t –2, keiretsu t –2, block 2 t –2, block 3 t –2, block 4 t –2,leverage t –2, ownership –2)) 
First Stage Regression Statistics  
Block 4 -0.131 
(0.208) 
Ownership 0.009*** 
(0.028) 
No. of Observations 804 
Adjusted R2 0.038 
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Table 9 
Second-stage regression results of the two-stage least squares estimates of board turnover 
and corporate governance attributes on performance 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Price Index (TOPIX) 150 Index over the period 1991 to 2001.  Performance is 
measured using market adjusted stock returns based on the TOPIX 150 Index. Board 
turnover is measured as the dismissals of board members during a calendar year divided 
by the number of board members in the previous year. 
 
*p < 0.10 
 **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent Variable:  Performance t –2  
Intercept 0.356*** 
(0.0004) 
Turnover -2.532*** 
(0.0005) 
No. of Observations 804 
Adjusted R2 0.0138 
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Table 10 
Logit regression estimates of the likelihood of appointments of routine and non-routine 
president turnover versus performance 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Price Index (TOPIX) 150 Index over the period 1991 to 2001.  Performance is 
measured using market-adjusted stock returns based on the TOPIX 150 Index and is 
computed over two fiscal years prior to turnover.  Turnover is termed routine if the 
president remains on the board of directors.  Turnover is termed non-routine if the 
president does not remain on the board of directors.  Performance is measured using 
market adjusted stock returns based on the TOPIX 150 Index.  P-values for the two-tailed 
tests are in parenthesis.   
 
Estimated 
Model:  
Probability (routine turnover) =ƒ 
(performancet-2) 
Probability (non-routine turnover) =ƒ 
(performancet-2) 
Intercept -1.935*** 
(0.0001) 
-3.826*** 
(0.0010) 
Performance -0.484 
(0.153) 
0.421 
(0.281) 
No. of 
Observations 
1283 1283 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.003 
    *p < 0.10 
  **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
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Table 11 
Regression estimates of the likelihood of appointments of bank and corporate directors 
versus performance and corporate governance attributes 
 
The sample consists of 117 nonfinancial Japanese firms obtained from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange Price Index (TOPIX) 150 Index over the period 1991 to 2001.  Performance is 
measured using market-adjusted stock returns based on the TOPIX 150 Index.  Directors 
previously employed by a nonfinancial corporation are classified as corporate directors 
and those with banking experience are bank directors.  Relationship measures are 
leverage, calculated as long-term debt over total assets, the percentage of shares owned 
by the ten largest shareholders, and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a 
member of a keiretsu, zero otherwise.  Sample sizes vary due to missing data.  All 
explanatory variables are computed over two years prior to firm performance.  P-values 
for the two-tailed tests are in parenthesis. 
 
Estimated Model: Probability (appointment of 
corporate director) =ƒ( 
performance, leverage, 
ownership, keiretsu) 
Probability (appointment of 
bank director) =ƒ( 
performance, leverage, 
ownership, keiretsu) 
Intercept -0.391 
(0.247) 
0.570 
(0.138) 
Performance 0.213 
(0.189) 
0.584 
(0.1125) 
Leverage 1.110*** 
(0.009) 
-0.8334* 
(0.086) 
Keiretsu 0.005 
(0.968) 
0.322** 
(0.033) 
Ownership 0.012 
(0.119) 
-0.003 
(0.712) 
No. of Observations 1039 1038 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.008 
    *p < 0.10 
  **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
 
